In a memorandum written in February 1942 that became known as the Ringle Report, Ringle estimated that the highest number of Japanese Americans "who would act as saboteurs or agents" of Japan was less than 3 percent of the total, or about 3500 in the United States; the most dangerous of these, he said, were already in custodial detention or were well known to the Naval Intelligence service or the FBI. In his summary Ringle concluded that the "Japanese Problem" had been distorted largely because of the physical characteristics of the people and should be handled based on the individual, regardless of citizenship, and not on race.
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The postwar Japanese-American effort towin redress, and its high point of the 1980s, is not that wellknown.3 Without question, the internment story continues tostimulate a variety of emotions.
The second issue was the question of racial discrimination, ..
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“This is an admirable compilation of the many strands and layers of this complex history. What sets this book apart is his tone of understanding and looking at things from the point of view of us, the victims of government policy, admirably illustrated by passages like this: ‘For the West Coast Japanese Americans the eleven months following Pearl Harbor were an extended waking nightmare as their illusions about their place in wartime American society were inexorably destroyed.’”
The internment of Japanese Americans in the United ..
Congress's action, both the OMB and Attorney General Edwin Meese IIIagreed, "could establish a bad precedent for other groups whofeel thatthey have suffered injustices." The courts, they concluded, had alreadyaddressed "the hard issues" in reference to all internment matters.
Joseph Wright, the deputy director of the OMB, once told Reagan thatCongress had even "demonstrated its incompetence with theredresslegislation through its dangerously vague rhetoric" in H.R.
The state decided to issue a few ..
Publicly, hisadministration considered the proliferation of Japanese corporationssetting up shop in 1980s America as "good for the economy," while thebooming success of Japanese electronic and automobile products withinthe United States was seen as "good for the American competitivespirit."18
Hence, outwardly, the Reagan administration was a friend to Japanesepolicy and in spite of Democratic Party and labor union complaints.
The Japanese‐American Internment: Perceptions of …
Meanwhile, the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Actof1948, claimed the OMB, had provided "meager and selective" restitutionto some internees, but the point was that the government had responded.
The Turning Point : Now That the Redress Issue Is …
To Reagan, that was good enough, although he asked his staffto "come up with something" that might please the Japanese-Americancommunity "beyond restitution payments."14 As governorofCalifornia, and then as the 1980 Republican nominee for president,Reagan had enjoyed significant support from the Japanese-Americancommunity.