Opponents of the union view have seized on claims like this asexcessive: union theorists, they claim, take too literally theontological commitments of this notion of a “we.” Thisleads to two specific criticisms of the union view. The first is thatunion views do away with individual autonomy. Autonomy, it seems,involves a kind of independence on the part of the autonomous agent,such that she is in control over not only what she does but also whoshe is, as this is constituted by her interests, values, concerns,etc. However, union views, by doing away with a clear distinctionbetween your interests and mine, thereby undermine this sort ofindependence and so undermine the autonomy of the lovers. If autonomyis a part of the individual’s good, then, on the union view,love is to this extent bad; so much the worse for the union view(Singer 1994; Soble 1997). Moreover, Singer (1994) argues that anecessary part of having your beloved be the object of your love isrespect for your beloved as the particular person she is, and thisrequires respecting her autonomy.
What is it, exactly, to bestow this kind of value on someone? It is,Singer says, a kind of attachment and commitment to the beloved, inwhich one comes to treat him as an end in himself and so to respond tohis ends, interests, concerns, etc. as having value for their ownsake. This means in part that the bestowal of value reveals itself“by caring about the needs and interests of the beloved, bywishing to benefit or protect her, by delighting in herachievements,” etc. (p. 270). This sounds very much like therobust concern view, yet the bestowal view differs in understandingsuch robust concern to be the effect of the bestowal of valuethat is love rather than itself what constitutes love: in bestowingvalue on my beloved, I make him be valuable in such a way that I oughtto respond with robust concern.
~Nicholas de ChamfortLove is not consolation.
In what follows, theories of love are tentatively and hesitantlyclassified into four types: love as union, love as robust concern,love as valuing, and love as an emotion. It should be clear, however,that particular theories classified under one type sometimes alsoinclude, without contradiction, ideas central to other types. Thetypes identified here overlap to some extent, and in some casesclassifying particular theories may involve excessive pigeonholing.(Such cases are noted below.) Part of the classificatory problem isthat many accounts of love are quasi-reductionistic, understandinglove in terms of notions like affection, evaluation, attachment, etc.,which themselves never get analyzed. Even when these accounts eschewexplicitly reductionistic language, very often little attempt is madeto show how one such “aspect” of love is conceptuallyconnected to others. As a result, there is no clear and obvious way toclassify particular theories, let alone identify what the relevantclasses should be.
Shakespeare’s ‘Sonnet 116’ | dylanseanrose
Somerset Maugham, , 1949
Life has taught us that love does not consist in gazing at each other but in looking outward together in the same direction.
Feb 03, 2011 · Shakespeare's Sonnet 116, ..
Do I love you because you're beautiful,
Or are you beautiful because I love you?
~Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein II,
For you see, each day I love you more
Today more than yesterday and less than tomorrow.
Forget love I'd rather fall in chocolate!
Love is not love which alters when it alteration finds, ..
Love a wildly misunderstood although highly desirable malfunction of the heart which weakens the brain, causes eyes to sparkle, cheeks to glow, blood pressure to rise and the lips to pucker.
Shakespeare Sonnet 116: Let Me Not To The Marriage …
Love is when you realize that he's as sexy as Woody Allen, as smart as Jimmy Connors, as funny as Ralph Nader, as athletic as Henry Kissinger and nothing like Robert Redford but you'll take him anyway.
FREE Love is Not Love Which Alters Essay - ExampleEssays
The second criticism involves a substantive view concerning love. Partof what it is to love someone, these opponents say, is to have concernfor him for his sake. However, union views make such concernunintelligible and eliminate the possibility of both selfishness andself-sacrifice, for by doing away with the distinction between myinterests and your interests they have in effect turned your interestsinto mine and vice versa (Soble 1997; see also Blum 1980,1993). Some advocates of union views see this as a point in theirfavor: we need to explain how it is I can have concern for peopleother than myself, and the union view apparently does this byunderstanding your interests to be part of my own. And Delaney,responding to an apparent tension between our desire to be lovedunselfishly (for fear of otherwise being exploited) and our desire tobe loved for reasons (which presumably are attractive to our lover andhence have a kind of selfish basis), says (1996, p. 346):