Carve Consulting | Creative vs Practical thinking

Egypt = the sun's daily return to its point of departure, passing through sky and underworld
Greece = death and rebirth
Gnostics = image of self-sustaining in Nature, endlessly recreating itself, the unity of duality, essential oneness of life, the universal serpent moving through all things
Roman = Saturn the god of time, and Janus the god of the New Year

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This paper expands on the view defended in , according to which imagination and belief have isomorphic contents and crucially differ only with respect to their functional role. The author argues that this view (known as “single code hypothesis”) helps to solve several puzzles surrounding our engagement with fiction.

Montessori and Imagination: The First Plane of ..

Imagination and Creativity Test | Psychologia
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The main claim of this paper is that belief is distinguished from other cognitive attitudes by its “aim at truth.” Velleman argues that imagination and belief have the same motivating power—a thesis he defends by discussing a large number of actions that seem to be imagination-driven—and so what distinguishes imagination and belief must be their respective aims.

Art is a diverse range of human ..

Currie, Gregory, and Ian Ravenscroft. Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. DOI:

The Land of Make Believe - Speech and Language …

This book articulates a comprehensive account of the cognitive architecture of imagination and its role in human psychological development. Topics discussed include the interplay of imagination and belief in children’s pretense, in counterfactual reasoning, and in magical/religious thinking. A classic in the psychological literature that is also clear and accessible to non-psychologists, this volume is highly recommended to any empirically oriented philosopher interested in these subjects.

The Land of Make Believe: How and Why to Encourage Pretend Play

This book argues that the same imaginative mechanisms that underlie pretense have a key role in explaining our capacity to understand our own and other people’s mental states. The picture of the functional architecture of imagination and belief that emerges in the discussion has been endorsed by many, but it has also been criticized in various ways.

But what is the connection between pretend play and language?

made imagination again a worthy subject for philosophical inquiry by showing its importance to various facets of our mental lives. , , and then offered extensive, systematic, and influential accounts of propositional imagination as a distinctive capacity operating alongside belief in our cognitive architecture. In spite of some significant disagreements (notably related to the existence of conative, or desire-like, imaginings), Currie and Ravenscroft’s and Nichols and Stich’s accounts share some important features. For one thing, both accounts postulate the existence of imagination for similar reasons—notably, to explain such phenomena as engagement with pretense, fiction, and mind-reading (although Currie and Ravenscroft also consider cases of psychopathology). On this basis, they both articulate a view according to which the relevant distinction between belief and imagination lies at the functional level—rather than at the level of the content—and involves two key functional differences: differences in the cognitive inputs in response to which beliefs and imaginings are formed, and differences in the behavioral outputs that they are (or are not) able to produce (with imaginings taken to have very limited, if any, motivating power). includes a number of papers that challenge this view in some important respects. Gendler argues that imaginings play an important role in a large range of everyday circumstances outside the domains of pretense, fiction, and mind-reading; and that the analysis of such circumstances reveals imagination’s motivating power to be much more similar to that of belief than it prima facie seems to be (on this, and on internal developments of Gendler’s view, see also and ). Much of Gendler’s discussion is indebted to the seminal paper on the aim of belief, which argued for the claim that imagination and belief do not, in fact, differ in any way with respect to motivating power. gives an article-length introduction to these recent philosophical debates on imagination and belief. provides a psychological perspective on these issues that complements the philosophical perspectives.