Exception: Good Faith - Michael Waddington

What's more, that's the way business was usually conducted. The deputy clerk testified that she never asked police any questions and never actually made a probable cause determination. Then there's this gem:

Good Faith Exception Applies, Even Without Prob. …

The Supreme Court held that evidence derived from Reynolds’s blood need not be suppressed because, when the officer obtained her blood without a warrant, a United States Supreme Court decision had been interpreted by Tennessee courts as authorizing the police to obtain blood without a warrant from DUI suspects. This binding appellate precedent was overruled after the officer obtained Reynolds’s blood. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the good-faith exception applied and remanded this case for further proceedings, including Reynolds’s trial.

Nov 07, 2014 · You Call That Probable Cause

You Call That Probable Cause?

EEOC v. Union Independiente De La Autoridad De Acueductos, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (evidence that Seventh-day Adventist employee had acted in ways inconsistent with the tenets of his religion, for example that he worked five days a week rather than the required six, had lied on an employment application, and took an oath before a notary upon becoming a public employee, can be relevant to the evaluation of sincerity but is not dispositive); Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 1973 WL 129 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1973) (employee’s contention that he objected to Sunday work for religious reasons was undermined by his very recent history of Sunday work); see also Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (employer had a good faith basis to doubt sincerity of employee’s professed religious need to wear a beard because he had not worn a beard at any time in his fourteen years of employment, had never mentioned his religious beliefs to anyone at the hotel, and simply showed up for work one night and asked for an on-the-spot exception to the no‑beard policy), aff’d, 2002 WL 390437 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2002) (unpublished).

First, here is a little background

When asked if she knew what probable cause is, she said, "no, I don't." She denied that it was part of her job responsibility to make a finding of probable cause. She simply gave the officer the oath, issued the warrants, and placed them into the computer system.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith ..

And that's true: Clerks were never informed that they had to make probable cause determinations independent of the police determinations. Essentially, they were rubber-stamping whatever police wanted, so long as the request was in the proper format.

Read Legal Commentary: How Far Does Police "Good Faith" Go

The kicker here is that the three misdemeanor arrest warrants probably shouldn't have been issued in the first place. A deputy clerk admitted that there was no probable cause determination made; the warrants merely recited the statutory language, with no facts supporting the probable cause admission.

All states recognize at-will employment

That's not cool; the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly rejected warrant-issuing magistrates as being "rubber stamp[s] for the police." But even so, the exclusionary rule is a deterrent, and its use is limited to situations in which it would have a deterrent effect. In this case, excluding the evidence would punish the police officers for a mistake the deputy clerk made.

However, some states place limitations on it

­As a result, the intermediate appellate court concluded that Reynolds’s constitutional rights had not been violated and evidence from her blood should not be excluded from trial. Recognizing that Reynolds could seek review of its decision in the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals alternatively opined that, even if Reynolds’s constitutional rights were violated, the Tennessee Supreme Court should adopt and apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which had already been adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Were the good-faith exception adopted and applied, the intermediate appellate court explained that evidence obtained from Reynolds’s blood need not be suppressed because her blood had been obtained in good-faith reliance on the implied consent law and a decision of the United States Supreme Court indicating that warrants were not required to obtain blood from DUI suspects.